The war in Gaza is in a new phase. The fighting is tapering down, although Israel is still conducting air strikes against Hamas. One of these on July 13th may have killed the military mastermind behind the October 7th attacks, Muhammad Deif, as well as scores of fighters and civilians. Ceasefire talks continue in Qatar and Cairo, with signs that Hamas is prepared to agree to a temporary truce and a swap of hostages and prisoners, without first demanding a permanent Israeli withdrawal.
Binyamin Netanyahu, Israel’s prime minister, is clinging to power. On July 24th he is due to address Congress in Washington, where he is likely to dwell on the threat posed by Iran and its proxies to Israel and the region—and evade the question of what happens next in Gaza. America should call him out. As our forthcoming podcast from the exclave explains, it could become a failed statelet, a “Mogadishu on the Med”. This is an awful prospect for Gazans. It would also make Israel less safe.
A ceasefire would be welcome. It could allow the release of Hamas’s surviving hostages in return for Palestinian prisoners in Israel. It would allow a flood of aid and a de-escalation on Israel’s northern border, where the Israel Defence Forces (idf) and Hizbullah, a militia which like Hamas is backed by Iran, are engaged in tit-for-tat strikes that could turn into a war. Yet there should be no illusions about the vacuum in Gaza. Its 2.2m people live in a devastated, lawless hellscape, without a reliable supply of food or water. The idf directly controls perhaps a quarter of the territory. Elsewhere gangs and criminals roam, along with the rump of Hamas.
Many of the platitudes about Gaza are bunk. It is common to say that the Palestinian Authority (pa) in the West Bank could become Gaza’s governing body. Our interview with Mohammad Mustafa, the pa’s prime minister, shows it has plans to administer and provide security for the exclave. Yet the pa’s finances are shot, partly because Israel is withholding tax revenues owed to it, and any PA security force would be unwilling to confront Hamas. Similarly, it is often said that Arab governments could step in. The Gulf states are willing to provide cash, and Jordan could train security forces. But they are unlikely to put boots on the ground, for obvious reasons: an Arab force could face a guerrilla war with Hamas and would be viewed by most Arabs as being complicit with Israel.
On the present trajectory, two grimmer scenarios are likely. One is anarchy, with crooks, warlords and Hamas competing for turf, and the idf controlling the border and transport arteries while conducting periodic strikes. The other is a gradual re-occupation of parts of Gaza, with the idf steadily being sucked in, hoping to buttress Israel’s security. Israel’s far right might then seek to re-establish settlements. In both cases there would be little hope for Gazans and none of the predictability that reconstruction requires.
When in Washington Mr Netanyahu will emphasise the threat to Israel, the region and the West posed by Iran. It is indeed a serious danger, with its network of militias, nuclear enrichment drive and ties with Russia. But Americans on all sides must remind Mr Netanyahu that a different approach to the Palestinians would enhance Israel’s security, not erode it.
Releasing funds to the pa would strengthen its capacity to administer parts of Gaza. Opening a path to talks on a two-state solution would foster long-term bipartisan support for Israel in America. It would also make it easier, politically, for Arab states to support the pa in Gaza and for the pa to co-operate with the idf to contain and deter what remains of Hamas. Repairing Arab-Israeli relations would allow deeper defence co-operation between America, the Gulf states and Israel, which would help counter Iran. The day after in Gaza is going to be hellish. Magical thinking won’t help.
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